Japanese Attitudes Towards Commerical Agreements with the People\u27s Republic of China by Marks, Lewis & Ono, Masaru
JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 
WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA* 
Lewis Marks** 
with the assistance of 
Masaru Ono*** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
II. JAPANESE DOMESTIC MODEL OF CONTRACTS AND WHY 
THIS MODEL IS USED IN JAPAN-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (P.R.C.) AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
A. Japanese Attitudes Towards Commercial 
Agreements: Views of Rights and 
Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
B. Application of Japanese Domestic Model to 
Japan-P.R. C. Agreements and Why the P.R. C. Perceives 
Japan as a Model ....... . ..... . ..................... 62 
III. THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF JAPAN-P.R.C. TRADE 
AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN JAPAN-P.R.C. 
AND JAPAN-UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
LEVEL AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
A. Pre-1972 Structural Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
B. Post-1972 Structural Framework and 
Contrasts in U.S.-P.R. C. Government Agreements . . . . . 67 
IV. COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 
A. Forms of Trade and Problem A re as . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 
B. Contractual Provisions in Japan-P.R.C. 
Private Commercial Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
VI. APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
*The authors acknowledge the constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article 
by Professor Michael Young of Columbia University and Mary Faith Higgins. They also ap-
preciate the assistance of C. Kaneda and K. Kohno and the intellectual inspiration of Pro-
fessor R. Randle Edwards and Laurence Vogel. 
**Associated with Yanagida & Sakuragi, Tokyo, Japan, (1977-1980). B.S.F.S. 
Georgetown University (1973); Columbia University East Asian Institute (Chinese Studies) 
(1973-1974); J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo (1977). 
***Associate, Yanagida & Sakuragi, Tokyo, Japan. LL.B. Tokyo University (1976). 
© 1980. Nothing herein may be quoted, copied, or otherwise reproduced without the 
express written permission of Lewis Marks. All rights hereunder are exclusively reserved 
to Lewis Marks. 
53 
1
Marks and Ono: Commercial Agreements
Published by SURFACE, 1979
54 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:53 
L INTRODUCTION 
Similar Japanese and Chinese attitudes towards contractual 
agreements are reflected in drafting form and in substantive pro-
visions. This similarity of attitudes stems from the position of com-
promise as a primary means of dispute resolution in each 
country's legal system. The primacy of compromise is reflected in 
simply drafted agreement provisions and the use of the expres-
sions "friendly" and "mutual discussion" as the method by which 
to settle, for example, payment problems and disputes in the inter-
pretation of a particular agreement. Although arbitration is pro-
vided for in all Japan-People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) agree-
ments, the requirement that each party receive the approval of its 
national government to give full force and effect to an arbitration 
tribunal's decision underlines the mutual preference for settling 
disputes by friendly and mutual discussions.1 
This article intends to demonstrate the similarity of Japanese 
and Chinese attitudes towards contractual agreements by con-
trasting Japan-.P.R.C. agreements with Japan-United States and 
Japan-third world agreements. This similarity of attitudes, the 
structural support framework for bilateral trade, technology, and 
after-sales service can explain Japan's success in trading with the 
P.R.C. 
Section II will examine Japanese attitudes towards domestic 
commercial agreements and explain w by this domestic model is 
used in business transactions with the P .R.C. Section III will set 
out the structural framework of trade between Japan and the 
P.R.C. prior to and after the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries in 1972. This section will thereafter 
focus on the contrast in content between the J apan-P .R.C. Agree-
ment Concerning Trade2 and the U .S.-J a pan Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation.3 Section IV will examine current 
forms of Japan-P.R.C. commercial transactions and focus on dif-
1. NI-CHUBOEKI HIKKEI (MANUAL OF JAPAN-CHINA TRADE), 43 JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1979). 
2. Nippon-koku to chuka-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no boeki ni kansuru kyotei 
(Agreement Between Japan and the People's Republic of China Concerning Trade), 93 
GENKO-HOKI SORAN (ALL EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS) (Joyaku [Treaties]), 2171-162 to 
2171-163-3 (effective Sept. 15, i974), [hereinafter cited as Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement]. 
3. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of 
America and Japan, done April 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063-2084 T.l.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct. 
30, 1953), '(hereinafter cited as U.S.-Japan Treaty]. 
2
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ferences among selected Japan-P.R.C., Japan-U.S., and Japan-
third world commercial agreements. 
The Japan-P.R.C. paradigm of commercial agreements is 
worthy of study by U.S. lawyers and businessmen engaging in 
commercial transactions with the P.R.C. Although U.S. legal at-
titudes and Japanese-Chinese attitudes towards the detail of con-
tract provisions differ, the success of Japan in trading with the 
P.R.C. should give pause to U.S. lawyers and businessmen to 
rethink the necessity of offering detailed draft proposals to P .R.C. 
enterprises. Indeed, P.R.C. government officials have stated that 
Japan-P.R.C. commercial agreements should be studied as model 
cases by other countries.4 
IL JAPANESE DOMESTIC MODEL OF CONTRACTS AND 
WHY THIS MODEL IS USED IN JAPAN-P.R.C. 
AGREEMENTS 
A. Japanese Attitudes Towards Commercial Agreements: 
Views of Rights and Obligations 
Commercial agreements between Japanese and foreign enter-
prises may be divided into three paradigms, Japan-U.S., Japan-
third world, and Japan-P.R.C. Focusing on licensing agreements, 
for example, a Japan-U.S. agreement where the licensor is a U.S. 
corporation and the licensee a Japanese corporation will usually 
contain detailed clauses as to exclusivity, royalty calculation 
(minimum royalty and periodic payments), the licensee's obligation 
to protect licensed patents and trademarks against infringement 
claims, marking of licensed products by the licensee, warranty 
disclaimer, confidentiality obligation of the licensee, technical 
assistance, and arbitration in accordance with the U .S.-J a pan 
Trade Arbitration Agreement of September 16, 1952.5 
4. This statement was made by Ma-Yi, Vice Minister, P.R.C. State Economic Com 
mission and Fang Zhichun and Gan Ziyu, Vice Ministers, P.R.C.-Japan Planning Commis-
sion. A. Moroguchi, Goben mondai no chugoku-gawa no kangaekata (Chinese Side's Way of 
Thinking With Respect to Joint Venture Problems), 78 Nicchukeizaikyokai (Japan China 
Association of Economy and Trade Report) 9 (Jan. 1980), [hereinafter cited as Goben mon-
dai]. 
5. Agreement Between the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association and the 
American Arbitration Association to Facilitate the Use of Commercial Arbitration in Trade 
Between Japan and the United States of America, September 15, 1952; CHUSAI-HOKI-SHU 
(COLLECTION OF ARBITRATION LAWS) at 111-1 to III-4, Kokusaishojichusaikyokai (International 
Commercial Arbitration Association) (1972), [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Agreement]. 
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A Japan-third world agreement with a Japanese licensor and 
third world licensee will contain detailed clauses in favor of the 
Japanese party, such as: 
licensor's technical personnel will be dispatched to licensee's 
plant for technical guidance and licensee's personnel accepted at 
licensor's Japan plant for three months total each, during the 
term of the agreement. Expenses will be paid by licensee several 
weeks in advance of departure of licensor's staff to licensee's 
plant, or prior to arrival in Japan of licensee's staff.6 
Japanese corporate personnel and attorneys7 explain the need 
for detailed drafting in the Japan-U.S. and Japan-third world 
models in terms of each party's legal consciousness. In the United 
States, contract law doctrine, including the statute of frauds and 
the parol evidence rule, leads to detailed contract provisions.8 If 
the Japanese party does not agree on such detailed drafting, 
generally, the United States side will not conclude the agreement, 
especially if it is a licensing agreement. With third world agree-
ments, the Japanese party is anxious to protect its confidential 
know-how and to obtain payment. In those third world countries 
with a British colonial past, the contract law statute of frauds and 
the parol evidence rule also demand detailed drafting.9 
To understand the Japan-P.R.C. paradigm, it is necessary to 
explain Japanese attitudes towards domestic commercial agree-
ments and why the domestic model is used in transactions with 
China. Japanese merchants view a contractual relationship as one 
of cooperation, friendship, and co-reliance.10 Thus, rights and 
obligations are not perceived as being limited within the "four cor-
ners" of a contract. Rather, there is a tacit understanding between 
6. This information was drawn from a number of agreements reviewed by the 
authors. 
7. Interview with Professor M. Young, visiting research scholar, Faculty of Law, 
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan, April 21, 1980. 
8. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Statute of Frauds) provides in pertinent part, "a contract for the 
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable ... unless there is some writing 
... ," and § 2-202 (Parol ... Evidence) provides in pertinent part, "[t]erms ... in ... writing 
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement ... may not be contradicted 
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement." 
9. For the English common law statute of frauds see, The Statute of Frauds at 
178-96 and for parol evidence see, The Contents of the Contract at 113, in M.P. FuRMSTON, 
LAW OF CONTRACT (9th ed. 1976). 
10. Wagakuni ni okeru keiyaku-kan (1) (Views of contracts in Japan (1)), No. 200 NBL 
at 6-7 (Jan. 1980). 
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the parties regarding the extent to which contract provisions shall 
impose an obligation on one party and grant a right to the other 
party. This tacit understanding stems from lengthy negotiations 
which invariably precede the conclusion of a complex commercial 
agreement. In the case of a licensing agreement, the parties will 
engage in negotiations over a period of months or even years. 
The first step in negotiations calls for each side to become 
well acquainted with members of the other side. To company 
management the character of the individuals in a prospective 
licensee's management is important. In addition, good social rela-
tions allow for a more relaxed negotiating atmosphere and a 
deeper understanding of the other side's way of thinking. 
At the conference table, each side's understanding of the 
other theoretically lessens the necessity of drafting detailed con-
tract provisions.11 Additionally, there are other beliefs underlying 
the emphasis on tacit understanding. The stipulation of detailed 
rights and obligations indicates distrust between the parties.12 
Furthermore, detailed provisions cannot foresee future situations. 
It is preferable to settle problems on a case-by-case basis through 
friendly discussion and co-reliance. This friendly discussion and co-
reliance is possible only when a working relationship of trust has 
been built between the parties. Finally, the Japanese character is 
such that it is imperative to consider the other party's position at 
all times.13 
Provisions in Japanese domestic commercial agreements 
often contain such ambiguous expressions as "friendly discussion," 
11. But see NIPPON-JIN NO HO-ISHIKI (LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF JAPANESE) at 88 (ed. 
Nihonbunkakaigi [Japan Cultural Conference) 1973), in which 88.5% of those questioned in a 
survey expressed a preference for concrete, detailed contracts as opposed to 8.5% who ex-
pressed a preference for simple contracts. 
12. The following volumes are references stating the Japanese view towards con-
tracts: E. Hoshino, Gendai ni okeru keiyaku (Contracts in Modern Times), MINPO RON'SHU (3) 
(ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL CODE (3)) (1972); T. KAWASHIMA, NIPPON-JIN NO HO-ISHIKI (JAPANESE CON-
SCIOUSNESS OF LAW) (1967); J. Kamishima, T. Sawaki, K. Tokoro and T. Amaji, Nippon-jin no 
keiyaku-kan (Japanese Views of Contracts), NIPPON-JIN TO HO (JAPANESE AND LAW) (1978); 
Wagakuni ni okeru keiyaku-kan (1)(2)(3)(4) (Views of Contracts in Japan (1)(2)(9)(4)), Nos. 200 
to 203 NBL (Jan. and Feb. 1980); W. Kashiwagi, Sho-torihiki no jissai to genko-keiyakuho: 
business-kai ga nozomu keiyakuho no gendaika (Practice of Commercial Transactions and 
Current Contract Law: Modernization of Contract Law Desired by Business Circles), No. 33 
NBL at 33-39 (Oct. 1974). 
13. Y. Ishida, Nippon to obei no keiyaku ni tsuite no kangae-kata (Japanese and 
European-American Views of Contracts), Nos. 7-8 KOKUSAI-SHOJI-HOMU (1979). 
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"cooperate," "sufficient," "necessary" and "mutually acceptable."14 
These ambiguous provisions reflect the mutual trust and tacit 
understanding which exists between the parties. Ambiguous pro-
visions also permit flexibility in interpretation of agreement 
clauses in the future. 
Domestic commercial agreements, generally, do not contain 
"whereas," jurisdiction, or arbitration clauses. "Whereas" clauses 
are viewed as inadequate to express relations between the con-
tracting parties. Jurisdiction clauses are not viewed as necessary 
for a variety of reasons. First, one party's insistence on the inclu-
sion of a jurisdiction clause would be viewed by the other party as 
a lack of trust. Second, even though Japanese district courts are 
generally limited in jurisdiction to the prefecture in which they are 
located, many Japanese companies have offices in large population 
centers. Accordingly, it is convenient for one party to travel to the 
other party's location to bring suit.15 Arbitration in domestic con-
tracts is not familiar in J apan.16 Rather, compromise fulfills the 
function which arbitration performs in U.S. domestic commercial 
agreements when it is specified in an agreement. A final factor is 
that Japanese parties often trust public bodies such as courts.17 A 
domestic form licensing agreement used in Japan is included in 
the Appendix as an illustration of the simplicity and brevity of 
commercial agreements in Japan. 
A lawyer's review of domestic contract provisions usually 
does not occur until a serious dispute has surfaced. As a general 
rule, Japanese corporate personnel consider the review by a 
lawyer of a domestic commercial agreement to be a sign of lack of 
mutual trust between the parties. Also, the limited number of 
lawyers in Japan18 and the lawyer's traditional role as essentially a 
litigator indicate a preference for thorough review of domestic 
14. Many Japanese domestic contracts contain such provisions as, "if any problems oc-
cur with regard to this contract, the parties shall discuss in good faith." Legally, it may be 
stated that the parties carry on mutual discussions based on this provision. 
15. Distances are short in Japan. For example, from Tokyo to Osaka it is only 545 
kilometers. 
16. In certain contracts, for example, construction contracts, an arbitration clause 
must be included. See Kensetsugyoho (Construction Business Law), article 19-11, (1956) as 
discussed in Kenchiku no horitsu-sodan (CONSULTATIONS ON CONSTRUCTION) at 277-281 (1970). 
17. NIPPON-JIN NO HO-ISHIKI, supra note 11, at 74, 94, 164. 
18. At present there are 11,536 licensed attorneys in Japan, Nippon-bengoshi-rengo-
kai kaiin meibo (Register of Japan Federation of Bar Associations) (July l, 1979). 
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commercial agreements before a dispute arises.19 
In contrast, Japanese lawyers generally review international 
commercial agreements during the drafting and negotiation 
stages. However, Japanese lawyers generally do not participate in 
negotiations between a client and contract party leading to the 
conclusion of an international agreement. This contrasts with the 
general practice in the United States of including lawyers in 
similar contract negotiations. 
When disputes arise between parties to a domestic commer-
cial agreement, every effort is made to reach a settlement through 
friendly discussions. These discussions usually involve the par-
ticipation of personnel of the respective contracting parties only. 
If possible, the parties will strive to maintain an amicable relation-
ship between the contracting parties and at the same time avoid a 
loss of face by either party .20 This method of agreement is sanc-
tioned by Article 695 , of the Civil Code, which provides that, "a 
compromise becomes effective when the parties have agreed to 
terminate a dispute between them by mutual concessions."21 
19. Professor M. Young has suggested that according to preliminary investigations, 
Japanese attorneys in Tokyo spend an average of 15% -20% of their time reviewing con-
tracts. 
20. See Ohta and Hozumi, Compromise in the Course of Litigation, 6 LAW IN JAPAN: 
AN ANNUAL 97, 99-101 (1973). 
21. There are two forms of compromise recognized under Japanese law: out-of-court 
compromise and compromise during the course of litigation. Out-of-court compromise has 
the same effect as judgment when the parties declare the particulars of their agreement to 
the court in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. Compromise during the course of 
litigation also has the same effect as a judgment. Compromise provisions are as follows: 
CIVIL CODE (Japan, 1896) 
(Compromise) 
Article 695. A compromise becomes effective when the parties have agreed to 
terminate a dispute between them by mutual concessions. 
(Effect) 
Article 698. If, in cases where it has, by a compromise, been admitted that one 
of the parties possesses the right constituting the object of a dispute or that the 
other party does not possess such right, it has afterwards been established that 
the former party did not possess the right or that the other party did possess the 
same, such right shall be treated as having by virtue of the compromise been 
transferred to the former party or extinguished as the case may be. 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Japan, 1890). 
(Attempt of compromise) 
Article 136. The court may, whatever stage the suit may be in, attempt to 
carry out compromise or have a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge try the 
same. 
2. The court, a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge may for compromise 
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If, subsequent to friendly discussions, one party files a suit in 
court, compromise during the course of litigation is provided for 
by Article 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21 • 1 This article per-
mits a judge to attempt to carry out a compromise at any time 
during the course of litigation. Compromise negotiations may be 
commenced at the initiative of either of the parties or by the 
court. The active position of a judge in the Japanese civil law 
system, in contrast to the passive role of judges in the United 
States, facilitates judicial initiative.22 
The pitfall of agreeing to a judge-initiated compromise is that 
both parties may feel they have been forced to accept a solution. 
Parties to a lawsuit in Japan tend to be reluctant to challenge a 
judge's suggestion, since such challenge tends to result in a deci-
sion unfavorable to the party refusing to compromise.23 In addi-
tion, lawsuits in Japan tend to be lengthy, resulting in high litiga-
tion fees. 24 Even when a favorable judgment is obtained, enforce-
order the principal party or his legal representative to appear before court. 
(Effect of protocol of compromise, waiver, or admission) 
Article 203. In case a compromise, waiver of claim or admission has been 
entered in a protocol, such entry shall have the same effect as a judgment becom-
ing final and conclusive. 
(Compromise prior to institution of complaint) 
Article 356. The parties may, regarding a civil controversy, bring a motion for 
compromise before the summary court located in the place where the general 
forum of the other party exists by setting forth the purport and ground for claim 
as well as the actual circumstances of the controversy. 
2. On a compromise being arranged, it shall be entered in the protocol. 
3. In the event that a compromise is not arranged, the court shall, upon mo-
tion of both parties appeared on the date for compromise, order them to forthwith 
proceed to oral argument of the suit. In this case the movant of compromise shall 
be deemed to have instituted suit at the time when he made the motion and the ex-
penses for compromise shall be made a part of court costs. 
4. In the event that the movant or the other party does not appear on the date 
for compromise, the court may deem the proposed compromise to be a failure. 
21.1 Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 21, art. 136. 
22. The active role of a Japanese judge aids the in-court compromise process. Issues, 
e.g., are defined through pleadings and through the judge's questioning of the parties and 
witnesses. The judge often suggests compromise to the parties and helps to fashion a com-
promise solution to the issues in dispute. S. Muto, Concerning Trial Leadership in Civil 
Litigation: Focusing on Judge's Inquiry and Compromise in COMPARATIVE LAW: JAPANESE 
LAW C-133-C-157 (Y. Nagashima, course materials, Harvard Law School, Fall 1978). 
23. See Ohta and Hozumi, Compromise in the Course of Litigation, supra note 20, at 
102-106. 
24. In one patent infringement case, for example, stamp tax for a 4- 1/2 year trial 
(March, 1966-September, 1970) amounted to ii529,000 (@250ii/$US1 = $2,116), lawyers' 
fees conceivably amounted to ii5,000,000 ($20,000) on a recovery of i130,000,000 ($120,000). 
American Cyanamid Co., Inc. v. Nissan Chemical K.K. (Toyama Dist. Ct. 1970), reprinted in 
K. OGAWA, PATENT SENSO (PATENT WAR) at 76-87 (1977). 
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ment may take up to five years due to various procedural delaying 
tactics which are available to the losing party .25 
Compromise may thus be viewed from two perspectives. The 
first is each party's desire to avoid losing face and to arrive at a 
solution which will retain the basis for possible future business 
relations, or at the very least, maintain a good reputation in trade 
circles. The second is the prohibitive cost of litigation and enforce-
ment, and the hesitancy of the parties to clash with a judge's sug-
gestion. 
Even though Japanese corporations draft detailed interna-
tional commercial agreements, the strong preference for flexibility 
in interpretation of provisions and the use of compromise to settle 
disputes remains. At times, this leads to serious disputes. One 
leading example, the Australian sugar dispute,26 illustrates the 
Japanese side's desire for flexibility in a change of commodity 
market price situation. 
In December of 1974 thirty-one Japanese sugar companies 
and the Colonial Sugar Refinery of Australia agreed on a long-
25. If, for example, plaintiff recovers a ~10 million judgment against defendant and 
this decision is affirmed on appeal, plaintiff must undertake a compulsory procedure to 
recover. Let us assume that the defendant has funds in the bank, land, and goods produced 
by defendant. Delaying tactics often used by defendant to hinder plaintiff's compulsory ex-
ecution are: (1) refusal to accept service of decision; (2) plaintiff applies to court for execu-
tion against bank deposit and court issues order. to bank (which takes two to three weeks). 
(This delay gives defendant an opportunity to transfer funds as defendant has notice that 
plaintiff has applied for order); (3) Plaintiff may request the court to sell defendant's land. 
Defendant may object to granting of order for sale of land and thereafter may object to each 
procedure of the court. As this is a kind of regular litigation procedure, this process will 
take up to three years. Even if plaintiff wins, official sales are usually held only once every 
four months. Also, it is usually difficult to sell the land at the fair market value. Each time 
the sale fails, ten percent is deducted from the asking price. The sale of land may last up to 
an additional three years; and (4) in the case of goods, plaintiff must apply for sale of defen-
dant's goods. This is at times difficult to achieve as title to goods is often unclear. As with 
land, there are several processes: e.g., (1) oppose the plaintiff in obtaining a court order, and 
(2) object to order on the grounds that goods belong to third party. This process will often 
last up to three years. M. Ujiie, Bengoshi kara mita minji-saiban (1J (Civil Trial From A 
Lawyer's Viewpoint), in GENDAI-SHAKAI TO BENGOSHI (CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND 
LAWYERS), at 119-125 (August, 1977). 
In response to the amount of time spent in compulsory execution, the Diet (Japanese 
parliament) pa<5sed a completely new compulsory execution law in November, 1979 which 
will come into force on October 1, 1980. The main purpose of the law is to speed the com-
pulsory execution process. Urano, Minji-shikko-ho seitei no keika to igi ni tsuite (Process 
and Meaning in the Establishment of the Civil Compulsory Law) 30 JIYU TO SEIGI (LIBEHTY 
AND JUSTICE) 2-8 (December 1979). 
26. "Nichi-go keiyaku-kosho no nokoshita kyokun" ("Lessons from the Negotiations 
Between Japan and Australia Regarding Sugar"), in Wagakuni ni okeru keiyaku-kan (1), 
supra note 10, at II, § 2. 
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term sugar supply contract for the supply of 600,000 tons of sugar 
per year for five years at a price of 229 pounds sterling per ton. 
This price was approximately one-half the international market 
price when the contract was executed. Subsequent to the execu-
tion of the contract, the world market price of sugar decreased 
substantially. 
The Japanese side requested a lowering of the contract price 
based upon the principle of changed circumstances, despite the 
fact that the contract provisions did not recognize a drop in the 
market price as justifying a downward adjustment in the contract 
price. The Japanese side based its reasoning on the notion that 
compromise in light of changed circumstances was justifiable. This 
position is often adopted by one side in Japanese domestic con-
tract disputes, and parties often compromise on this basis. 
The Australian side refused this request and applied for ar-
bitration. The Japanese side managed to delay the actual arbitra-
tion proceedings through negotiations to the point where the 
Australian side agreed to a downward price adjustment. A com-
promise agreement was reached in 1976 after two years of 
negotiations.26• 1 
B. Application of Japanese Domestic Model to Japan-P.R. C. 
Agreements and Why the P.R. C. Perceives Japan as a Model 
From the Japanese perspective, a mixture of emotional and 
practical factors explains the application of simply drafted com-
mercial agreements to agreements with the P.R.C. These include 
cultural affinity, lingering guilt over World War II, and the view 
that China is a natural trading partner. 
Although vastly different, the adoption by Japan of Chinese 
language ideographs, Confucian social ethics, Buddhism, and early 
Chinese administrative legal structures has greatly influenced 
Japanese respect for Chinese culture. These cultural factors have 
enabled Japanese businessmen, for example, to feel more at ease 
when negotiating a commercial agreement with the P .R.C. than 
with U.S. corporations. 
Japanese enterprises are eager to cooperate with the P.R.C. 
in the development of natural resources. Such development, it is 
hoped, will provide Japan with a secure supply of raw materials. 
Also Japanese businessmen are eager to invest in labor intensive 
26.1 Id. 
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industries in the P.R.C. as many of these industries, e.g. textiles, 
have become unprofitable in Japan. 
Finally, Japanese businessmen believe that the P.R.C. has a 
similar attitude towards contracts. P.R.C. draft agreement pro-
posals are also simply drafted. Numerous provisions in such drafts 
provide for settlement of issues via friendly or mutual discussion, 
as is the case in Japanese domestic commercial agreements. 
Japanese businessmen are also aware of the historical primacy of 
compromise in the Chinese legal system.27 
From the Chinese perspective, Japan is admired as the only 
Asian country to have modernized independent of domination by 
western countries. In addition, the Chinese are aware of the 
cultural affinity, and believe that Japan is a natural trading part-
ner. Despite differences in political theory, certain Chinese 
leaders admire the collective spirit of Japanese workers as 
demonstrated by their loyalty to their employer.28 This collective 
spirit and the willingness to work hard are models which the 
P.R.C. seeks to emulate. 
In negotiations leading to the conclusion of commercial 
agreements, P .R.C. enterprise personnel often spend a good 
amount of time socializing with their Japanese counterparts. 
P.R.C. negotiators believe that it is important to become ac-
quainted with the other side's personality and, as a result, ascer-
tain character prior to engaging in serious negotiations.29 
The P.R.C. is also eager to obtain Japanese know-how in ex-
change for natural resources and labor intensive products. To the 
Chinese, Japanese know-how includes technology, quality control 
techniques, and management systems.30 Accordingly, Japan-P.R.C. 
licensing agreements include all three of these items, as further 
discussed in Section IV. 
An additional factor from the Chinese perspective is the 
primacy of mediation as a form of dispute resolution. Traditional-
ly, the Chinese have avoided litigation wherever possible resort-
27. Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist 
China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284 (1967); Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization 
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1966); and Marks, In-Court and Out-of-Court Mediation: A Compara-
tive Study of Taiwan, New York, and Wisconsin (unpublished seminar paper, State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo School of Law, Spring, 1975). 
28. Goben monda~ supra note 4. 
29. Ching, China's Prejudices Confront Capitalism, The Asian Wall Street Journal, 
April 4, 1980, at 6. 
30. Goben mondai, supra note 4. 
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ing instead to mediation.31 Subsequent to the founding of the 
P.R.C. in 1949, the government and the Communist Party em-
phasized the primacy of mediation as the preferred means of settl-
ing disputes. Although cast in the ideological terms of "persuasion 
by the masses" to achieve "correct thought," the essence of media-
tion remains the voluntary consent of both disputants to the sug-
gestions of a third party. 32 
At present, civil procedure law provides that, in civil cases, 
the parties may engage in mediation under the auspices of the 
mediation committee before proceeding to litigation.33 While inter-
national commercial agreements are not subject to this provision, 
the obligation of parties to engage in friendly or mutual discus-
sions to solve disputes before proceeding to arbitration 
demonstrates the applicability of this concept. 
III. THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF JAPAN-P.R.C. 
TRADE AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN JAPAN-P.R.C. 
AND JAPAN-U.S. GOVERNMENT LEVEL AGREEMENTS 
A. Pre-1972 Structural Framework 
Between 1952 and 1958, trade between the P.R.C. and Japan 
was based on four consecutive agreements employing the barter 
system of trade.34 These agreements were executed between the 
31. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, supra note 27. 
32. Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist 
China, supra note 27. 
33. FALU CHANGZHI SHOUTSE (HANDBOOK ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE) 165 (ed. Jin Mo-sheng, 
1979); and FALU ZHISHI WENDA (QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE) 202-203 (ed. 
Chen Chun-lung, 1979). 
34. The four agreements were: 
(a) June 1, 1952, executed by Nan Han-chen, chairman of CITPC and two 
Japanese Diet members, Tomi Koora and Kei Hoashi. The agreement was for 
one year with a target of £60,000,000 two-way trade; however, only 
$15,510,000 was achieved. 
(b) October 29, 1953, executed by CITPC and the Japanese trade delegation. This 
agreement was also for one year with a target of £60,000,000 two-way trade; 
however, only $59,870,800 was achieved. 
(c) May 4, 1955, 55 Agreements of the People's Republic of China [C.C.J.C.] 36 
(1968), executed by the CITPC, Japan Association for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade, Dietmen's League for the Promotion of Trade between Japan 
and China, and the Japan-China Trade Representative Group. The agreement 
was for two years, and in addition to trade, provided for the holding of trade 
exihibitions in the P.R.C. and Japan. In 1956, trade between the P.R.C. and 
Japan expanded to $150,990,000. Japan exported primarily iron and steel, 
chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, and imported primarily salt, 
coal, magnesia, and hides. 
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China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CITPC) 
and trade missions representing Japanese trade organizations. 
The Korean War, however, inhibited the growth of two-way trade, 
and the Nagasaki "flag incident" in 1958 caused a suspension of 
trade until 1960.35 
Trade resumed in August of 1960 based upon the "three 
political principles" and "three principles of trade" stipulated by 
the late Premier Chou En-lai. Based upon his belief in the in-
separability of politics and trade, Premier Chou stated that the 
P.R.C would not conduct business with Japanese companies which 
did not support the following political principles: (1) terminating 
any hostile attitude by Japan towards the P.R.C.; (2) not engaging 
in the scheme to establish two Chinas; and (3) not impeding the 
process of normalization of relations between the P.R.C. and 
Japan.36 The principles of trade included: (1) all agreements were 
to be government level agreements; (2) individual transactions 
could be concluded on a friendly private basis; and (3) trade in 
selected commodities, (for example, lacquer and sweet chestnuts) 
(d) July 1957-March 1958, the following agreements were executed: 
July, 1957 import (to Japan) agreement relating to magnesia; 120,000 
metric tons. 
August, 1957 import (to Japan) agreement relating to salt; 1,000,000 
metric tons. 
December, 1957 export (to P.R.C.) agreement relating to chemical fertilizers; 
amonium sulfate (400,000 metric tons); and urea (30,000 
metric tons). 
import (to Japan) agreement relating to rice; 50,000 metric 
tons. 
February, 1958 export (to P.R.C.) relating to urea; 20,000 metric tons. 
five year barter agreement relating to iron and copper. 
March, 1958 import (to Japan) agreement relating to rice; 30,000 metric 
tons. 
import (to Japan) agreement relating to soybeans; 265,000 
metric tons per year. 
Y. Miwa, Sino-Japanese Trade Relations After World War II, 1945-1962, at 14-32 (May 1974, 
preliminary draft) (quoted with permission of the author); and H. HIRAI, NI-CHU BOEKI NO 
KISOCHISHIKI (BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN-CHINA TRADE) 183-88, 307-14 (1971). 
35. On May 2, 1958, a P.R.C. flag at the site of a P.R.C. trade exhibition in Nagasaki 
was torn down by a Japanese youth. The police refused to prosecute and the Japanese 
government declined to apologize to the P.R.C. As a result, the P.R.C. announced a suspen-
sion of trade with Japan and cancelled all outstanding contracts. However, underlying this 
incident was Prime Minister Kishi's cabinet's statement concerning the fourth Sino-
J apanese trade agreement of March 1958. This statement clarified that expansion of 
P.R.C.-Japan trade was based upon the non-recognition of the P.R.C. Government by 
Japan. Miwa, supra note 34, at 38-39. 
36. NI-CHO' BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 8. 
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would be encouraged in order to support small enterprises.37 The 
P.R.C. subsequently conceded on the first trade principle, but the 
absence of relations between the two countries and the restric-
tions later imposed by the Coordinating Committee for Export 
Control (COCOM)38 inhibited the growth of two-way trade. 
Pursuant to these political and trade principles, the concept 
of friendship trade developed, and, thereafter, in 1962, memoran-
dum trade began.39 Under friendship trade only those trading com-
panies which accepted the above stated principles and which 
belonged to one of the trade promotion organizations were allowed 
to do business with the P.R.C.40 All companies which desired to 
conduct business with the P.R.C. were obliged to use the services 
of this select group of trading companies. Major Japanese trading 
companies established subsidiaries which qualified as friendly 
trading companies, and by 1971 the number of these subsidiaries 
had expanded to 238. 41 
The major functions of the friendly trading companies were 
to: (1) hold trade fairs in the respective countries; (2) dispatch 
trade and economic representative delegations; (3) promote the ex-
change of technology; and (4) work for the establishment of cor-
respondent relations between Japanese and P.R.C. banks.42 Three 
documents, the Agreement Concerning Promotion of Friendly 
Trade Between the Japanese and Chinese Peoples (1967), the 
Record of Discussions (1968), and the Joint Communique Between 
the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade 
and Six Associations and the China Committee for the Promotion 
37. Id. Trade was renewed on the basis that Japanese companies ordering Chinese 
products were "direct partners" and middlemen such as trading firms did not make profit. 
JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (JETRO), How To APPROACH THE 
CHINA MARKET 75 (1972). 
38. Tozdi boeki no arikata COCOM-kinyu-list o-haba-kanwa-saku fukumu (The 
Method of East-West Trade: COCOM Prohibited Export List Eased), Nipponkogyoshimbun 
(Japan Industrial Newspaper), Oct. 17, 1978, at 1. 
39. In 1961, the Japanese government discarded the principle of dealing with the 
P.R.C. only under a barter system, and shortly thereafter removed many export items from 
the COCOM list. Imports from the P.R.C. were subject to Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) approval. In 1962, deferred payments from the P.R.C. for steel and 
chemical fertilizers were approved. Japan Eximbank loan credits were also made available, 
but this was cancelled one year later. Miwa, supra note 34, at 65-67; and NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-
CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 197. 
40. Primarily, those companies belonged to the Japan Association for the Promotion 
of International Trade. 
41. NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 188-189. 
42. Id. at 184. 
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of International Trade (1970) enumerated in detail the above prin-
ciples of friendship trade and the direction in which that trade was 
to proceed. 43 
As a supplement to friendship trade, a memorandum trade 
agreement (Takahashi-Liao Agreement) was initialed on Novem-
ber 9, 1962 with a five-year term, calling for an annual two-way 
trade totaling US$100 million over five years. Pursuant to this 
agreement, liaison offices were established in Peking and Tokyo, 
manufacturers were divided into groups according to products im-
ported or exported, and the selection of friendly Japanese trading 
companies was liberalized.44 This agreement was renewed in 1967, 
and until the signing of the Japan-China Trade Agreement in 197 4 
on a governmental level, this agreement served as a second basis 
of trade between the two countries.45 
Under the memorandum trade agreements, Japanese makers 
and users formed the Japan-China General Trade Liaison Con-
ference. Individual companies signed "memorandum trade" 
agreements for such products as plant exports, which in general 
had five year deferred-payment provisions, and for exports of 
chemical fertilizers, steel materials, agricultural products, and 
machines, each of which included provisions for payment from one 
to two years after acceptance of delivery .46 However, in 1965, the 
Satoh Government in Japan, under pressure from the U.S. govern-
ment, restricted the use of deferred payment provisions.47 
Prior to 1972, individual contracts between P.R.C. and 
Japanese companies reflected the non-governmental nature of 
P.R.C.-Japan relations. Contracts contained payment, arbitration, 
and other clauses in favor of the Chinese party. These clauses sug-
gest the absence of formal legal sanctions for enforcement. A 
typical form purchase agreement drafted by the P .R.C. party is 
discussed in section IV. 
B. Post-1972 Structural Framework and Contrasts in U.S.-
P.R. C. Government Agreements 
The success of Japan in trading with the P.R.C. subsequent to 
43. Id. at 184-85. 
44. Miwa, supra note 34, at 65. 
45. NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 186; and JETRO, THE JAPANESE 
PERSPECTIVE ON CHINA'S OPENING ECONOMY 182 (1979). 
46. NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 186. 
47. Id. at 187. 
48. Nippon-koku to chiika-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no boeki ni kansuru kyotei, 
supra note 2. 
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the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972 is partially at-
tributable to the structural support framework at the governmen-
tal, quasi-governmental, and private levels. Important govern-
ment level agreements are: the Japan-P.R.C. Agreement Concern-
ing Trade (1974),48 the Japan-P.R.C. Agreement Concerning The 
Protection of Trademarks (1978), 49 and the direct loan from Japan 
to the P .R.C.50 The quasi-governmental agreement is the untied 
Japan Eximbank Loan.51 There are two private level agreements, 
the Long Term Trade Agreement,52 and a loan agreement between 
thirty-one Japanese banks and the P.R.C.53 These agreements are 
substantially different from comparable United States-Japan 
agreements as they reflect the Japanese and Chinese preference 
for friendly discussion and compromise to settle disputes. 
The Trade and Trademark Agreements 54 merely outline 
general principles, leaving details to more specific governmental 
arrangement and private agreements. Each provision in the Trade 
and Trademark Agreements is simply drafted, in contrast to the 
content of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation (United States-Japan Treaty)55 which is detailed. The 
latter reflects the United States attitude that it is imperative to 
define every term and precisely draft an instrument so as to clear-
ly specify each party's rights and obligations. The Trade Agree-
49. Nippon-koku to chiika-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no shohyo no hogo ni kansuru 
kyotei, supra note 2, at 2171-163-4 to 2171-163-5; and Y. KOBAYASHI AND H. GOTO, NI-CHU 
SHOHYO HOGO KY()TEI: KAISETSU (JAPAN-CHINA AGREEMENT ON PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS: 
AN EXPLANATION) (1978). 
50. NICCHUKEIZAIKYOKAI (JAPAN-CHINA ASSOCIATION ON ECONOMY & TRADE), 79-12 
SHIRYO: NI-CHU KEIZAI 5 (MATERIALS ON JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMY) (1979). 
51. Tai-chu-yiishi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu-saidai no ken-an katazuku kam-min tomo 
chugoku daihyo-dan to choin e (Financing Negotiations with China Are Concluded: Japan-
China's Largest Pending Questions Are Settled: Officials and Private Companies and 
China's Negotiation Team Sign), Nihonkeizaishimbun (Japan Economic Times) May 15, 
1979, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Nikkei]. 
52. The initial agreement, private in nature, was signed in February, 1978. Shin-
dankai no ni-chu kyoryoku; jo (A New Stage in Japan-China Cooperation; Part/), Nikkei, 
Dec. 2, 1979, at 1. 
53. Tai-chu-yushi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu-saidai no kenan katazuku kam-min tomo 
chugoku daihyo-dan to chain e, Nikkei, supra note 51. 
54. Nippon-koku to chuka-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no shohyo no hogo ni kansuru 
kyotei, supra note 49. The Trademark Agreement provides for most favored treatment to 
legal or natural persons of either country who desire to register trademarks or other 
rights in either country. As with the Trade Agreement, the initial period is three years, 
and, thereafter, continues automatically unless terminated by thirty days' prior notice by 
either party. 
55. U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3. 
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ment consists of ten articles, in contrast to twenty-five articles in 
the United States-Japan Treaty. 
The preamble of the Trade Agreement affirms respect for the 
private trade system existing prior to 1972, and proceeds to 
declare the basing of trade on the principle of mutual equality and 
friendship. 56 The U.S.-Japan Treaty preamble, on the other hand, 
states the desire to encourage closer economic and cultural rela-
tions and to promote mutually advantageous commercial inter-
course, and is based upon unconditionally according national and 
most favored nation treatment.57 
The most prominent contrast between the two treaties is in 
the clauses dealing with dispute resolution. In the Trade Agree-
ment, parties are encouraged to settle disputes by friendly discus-
sion.58 In cases where no settlement is reached, provisions in in-
dividual commercial agreements shall be given effect. Each coun-
try shall accord an arbitration judgment effect where requested in 
accordance with domestic law. Further, each party is encouraged 
to use the arbitration bodies of each country .59 
The Trade Agreement dispute settlement provisions clearly 
demonstrate Japanese and Chinese preference for friendly discus-
sion to settle issues. Even if the parties resort to arbitration, the 
enforcement of an arbitration tribunal's award is dependent upon 
the domestic law of each country.60 This limitation serves to 
discourage each party from resorting to arbitration. Also, the 
Trade Agreement states that if arbitration is not stipulated in a 
commercial agreement between two companies, the contract par-
ties may bind themselves to a separate arbitration agreement.61 
This provision alludes to the practice of excluding an arbitration 
provision in Japanese domestic agreements. Finally, the Trade 
Agreement provides for a mixed commission composed of the 
members of each government to deal with any problems in the ex-
ecution of this agreement or with any trade problems in general.62 
Again, this provision indicates the Japanese and Chinese 
56. Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, preamble. 
57. U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3, preamble. 
58. Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 8(1). 
59. Id., article 8(3). 
60. Id., article 8(4). 
61. Id., article 8(2). 
62. Id., article 9. 
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preference for constant discussion to deal with ongoing trade pro-
blems. 
The U .S.-J a pan Treaty provides two methods for dispute 
resolution, litigation and arbitration.63 Court decisions are en-
forceable in accordance with the principle of equal access to the 
courts in each country by the aggrieved parties.64 Arbitration 
awards rendered outside the United States are enforceable to the 
"same measure of recognition as awards rendered in other States 
[of the United States]."65 
The U .S.-J a pan Treaty dispute settlement provisions 
underline the U.S. legal principles of comity and the opportunity 
to appear. It is also notable that no provision provides for the set-
tlement of disputes by friendly discussion or negotiation prior to 
formal legal procedures. However, parties will inevitably attempt 
to negotiate a settlement before invoking arbitration or litigating. 
The difference is that the U.S. side will inevitably bring an at-
torney to such negotiations, whereas in Japanese-Chinese 
disputes, an attorney is rarely brought into dispute settlement 
discussions. 
Most-favored-nation treatment is another area where the con-
trast between the two treaties is significant. Articles of the Trade 
Agreement provide for most-favored-nation treatment covering 
taxes or duties on import and export articles.66 Tax exemptions 
and duty exemptions are provided for goods, catalogues, articles 
used for demonstration or experimental purposes, articles 
displayed in trade fairs or exhibitions, tools used in assembling 
work or equipment installation, containers used in export or im-
port, and articles in transit through either of the signatory parties 
to third countries.67 
In contrast, the U.S.-Japan Treaty provides for both national 
and most-favored-nation treatment to a much greater scope. A 
total of six articles accord either national or most-favored-nation 
treatment. National treatment is accorded in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances. This treatment includes application of laws and 
regulations,68 access to courts and administrative tribunals,69 pro-
63. U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3, article IV(2). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 1. 
67. Id., article 2. 
68. U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3, article III. 
69. Id., article IV. 
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tection of leased or owned property,70 equal handling of products 
regarding internal taxation, sale, and distribution,11 and carrying 
of products by vessels.72 Most-favored-nation treatment is accord-
ed for access to courts and administrative tribunals,73 protection of 
leased or owned property ,74 entry and departure from the ter-
ritories of the other party for commercial travelers,75 application 
of customs duties on arriving and exported products,76 and taxa-
tion, sales, and distribution conditions for products.77 
Other provisions in the Trade Agreement are also drafted as 
principles with the single exception of the clause dealing with cur-
rencies of settlement.78 For example, transaction prices between 
the two countries are to be based upon international market 
prices.79 Additional provisions note that each country is bound to 
energetically endeavor to promote the flow of industrial 
technology ,80 and, to the greatest extent possible, encourage the 
holding of trade exhibitions in each country.81 
The U .S.-J a pan Treaty specifically addresses a number of 
commercial transaction issues. These issues include the level of 
exchange restrictions on payments, remittances, and transfers of 
funds or financial instruments,82 exchange rate quotations for 
private commercial agreements,83 and the absence of restrictions 
on the import or export of products.84 The rejection of double taxa-
tion is also dealt with at length in the U .S.-J a pan Treaty85 as well 
as in a separate U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty.86 No such treaty is in force 
70. Id., article VI. 
71. Id., article XI. 
72. Id., article XIX. 
73. Id., article IV. 
74. Id., article VI. 
75. Id., article XIII. 
76. Id., article XIV. 
77. Id., article XVI. 
78. Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 4(2). 
79. Id., article 5. 
80. Id., article 6. 
81. Id., article 7. 
82. U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3. 
83. Id., article XII. 
84. Id., article XIV. 
85. Id., article XI. 
86. Shotoku ni tai suru sozei ni kansuru nijyukazei no kaihi oyobi datsuzei no boshi no 
tame no nipponkoku to amerika-ga sshu-koku to no aida no joyaku (Treaty between Japan 
and U.S. on Income Tax with Regard to the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Tax Delin-
quency), 94 GENKO-HOKI SORAN (ALL EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS) 2187-230 to 2188 (June 
23, 1972). 
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between Japan and the P.R.C. Rather, provisions of the Trade 
Agreement address this issue.87 
The direct Japan-P.R.C. government loan, the Japan Exim-
bank loan, the Long Term Trade Agreement, and the private bank 
loan agreement, provide additional structural support for 
Japan-P.R.C. trade. The direct Japan to P.R.C. government loan 
agreement was executed on December 7, 1979, during Prime 
Minister Ohira's visit to the P.R.C. The loan, in the amount of ¥50 
billion (@1!250 = $1, US$200 million), is at the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) lowest in-
terest rate guideline and varies in duration according to each of 
six targeted projects.88 These projects are: 
(1) Shijiusuo gang jianshe (Shijiusuo harbor construction) 
(Shantung Province). This project covers the construction of har-
bor berths for ships carrying coal and iron ore. The berths will 
be used to facilitate shipment of Chinese coal overseas and to ac-
cept iron ore from Australia to supply five ironworks in the Pek-
ing vicinity. Construction time is estimated at three years. Of a 
total project cost of US$322 million, US$220 million will be fund-
ed by the loan; 
(2) Railway construction between Shijiusuo and Yanzhou 
(Shantung Province). This project involves the construction of a 
300-kilometer, one-track line for diesel locomotives in order to 
transport raw coal from Yanzhou to the port of Shijiusuo and to 
transport iron ore and general coal shipment inland. Construc-
tion time is estimated at three years. Of a total US$296 million 
cost, funds from the loan will total US$165 million; 
(3) Railway construction between Peking and Langwopu. 
This project includes the construction of a 150-kilometer double 
track for electric trains. This line will primarily be used to 
transport coal but will also be incorporated into a trunk line 
originating in Harbin. The construction period is estimated at 
three years. Of a total cost of US$642 million, US$375 million will 
be provided from the loan funds; 
(4) Construction and upgrading of the Jingguang railway 
line between Guangzhou and Hengyang (Guangdong and Hebei 
Provinces). The Japan Railroad Construction Corporation will 
dispatch engineers to assist in the construction of tunnels along 
87. Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 3. 
88. NICCHUKEIZAIKYOKAI (JAPAN-CHINA ASSOCIATION ON ECONOMY & TRADE), 1979-12 
SHIRYO: NI-CHU KEIZAI (MATERIALS ON JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMY) 1-5 (1979). 
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this line. The line is to be a double track and used for the ex-
change of general commodities between the interior and the 
South of the P.R.C. The construction period of this line is 
estimated to be four years at a total cost of US$1.87 billion. 
US$106 million of the loan funds will be applied to this project; 
(5) Qinhuangdao harbor expansion (Hebei Province). This 
project consists of the construction of two berths for 50,000 ton 
class ships. Upon the completion of the project in three years, 
the harbor will have an annual handling capacity of 300 million 
tons. Of a total cost of US$161 million, US$104 million will be 
provided by funds from this loan; 
(6) Wuqiangxi water electric works (Hunan Province). This 
project involves building a dam on the Ruanshui River to 
generate electricity, prevent flooding, and facilitate irrigation 
and water transport. The power generating capability of the 
dam is estimated at an annual 7.1 billion kilowatts. The electrici-
ty generated will be transmitted to Wuhan and to tin, lead, zinc, 
and other non-ferrous metalworks in the Wuhan area. In 1979, 
18,000 workers were transported to the project site to begin con-
struction in 1980. Construction is expected to take six years at a 
total cost of US$803 million with US$330 million to be funded 
from this loan; 
(7) Japan-China People's Friendship Memorial Hospital (Beij-
ing). This 1000-bed capacity hospital is scheduled for completion 
in two years. The Japan Ministry of Health has provided 
technical assistance to the P.R.C. physicians' group which will 
staff the hospital. Of a total cost of US$140 million, US$61 million 
will be provided as a straight grant. 
73 
The Japan Eximbank loan agreement ratified on May 15, 1979 
provides for the equivalent of US$2 billion in Japanese yen for 
resource development. In addition to this agreement, thirty-one 
private banks have earmarked US$2 billion in long-term funds and 
US$6 billion in short-term funds, primarily to finance deferred 
payments for plant exports to China. The Eximbank terms include 
a 6.25% per annum interest rate, with the financing period for in-
dividual projects to be decided on an individual project basis.89 An 
average ten-year loan period is predicted by Eximbank sources.90 
Although the loan is untied, Japanese financial and industrial 
89. Tai-chu-yushi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu-saidai no kenan katazuku kam-min tomo 
chugoku daihyo-dan to choin e, Nikkei, supra note 51. 
90. Id. 
21
Marks and Ono: Commercial Agreements
Published by SURFACE, 1979
74 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:53 
circles have predicted that private bank loans, which are to be 
tied, will be used to partially 'finance targeted projects of the 
Eximbank loan. In addition, it is speculated that the Japanese will 
use tied loans in conjunction with demonstration techniques and 
after-sales servicing to give Japanese industrial concerns a com-
petitive advantage over foreign firms in securing natural resource 
development project orders.91 
The Long Term Trade Agreement,92 as revised in March, 
1979, extended the original term from 1985 to 1990 and increased 
the goal of two-way trade from US$10 billion to a range of 
US$20-$30 billion. The terms of the agreement include a continued 
emphasis on deferred payments, denominated one-half in Japanese 
yen and one-half in U.S. dollars, for plant exports from Japan to 
the P.R.C., and interest rate payments at the OECD guideline. 
The terms of the private banks' loan package provide for: (1) 
an annual interest rate of 0.5% above the Eurodollar rate, for 
long-term funds of US$2 billion; and (2) an annual interest rate of 
0.25% above the Eurodollar rate, for short-term funds of US$6 
billion.93 
In addition to the above structural framework for two-way 
trade, Japanese-Chinese enterprise group joint projects are cur-
rently in the planning process. These projects include a joint ven-
ture for insurance,94 a joint project for the insurance of Chinese 
central government bonds and Fukien Province bonds in interna-
91. See Kaihatsu-sogaku ju-oku dolu: ni-chu-sekiyu-kaihatsu kyo choin: yu-gin shikin o 
shiyo, nippon hambun hikitori (Development Amount of $1 Billion: Japan-China Oil 
Development Agreement Signed Today: Using Eximbank Funds, Japan Obtained One-half 
of Oil Production), Nikkei, Dec. 7, 1979, at 1. 
92. The revised agreement was drafted and executed by the Japan-China Long-Term 
Trade Consultative Commission (P.R.C.) and the Yoshihiro Inayama Japan-China Long-
Term Trade Consultative Commission (Japan). NICCHUKEIZAIKYOKAI (JAPAN-CHINA ASSOCIA-
TION ON ECONOMY & TRADE) 1979-5 SHIRYO: NI-CHU KEIZAI (MATERIALS ON JAPAN-CHINA 
ECONOMY) 5 (1979). 
93. Tai-chu-yushi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu saidai no kenan katazuku kam-min tomo 
chugoku daihyo-dan to choin e, Nikkei, supra note 51. 
94. Types of insurance will be, (1) casualty insurance on freight shipped in import-
export transactions as a supplement to marine insurance, (2) ship insurance on vessels used 
to transport goods/plants and on vessels used in oil exploration, (3) assembly insurance 
covering materials used in plant construction, and (4) construction insurance on the con-
struction of factories and offices in the P.R.C. Ni-chu-kyodo-hoken-kyotei teiketsu e: hikiuke 
seppan de, choki- torikime anken taisho (Japan-China Joint Insurance Agreement Pro-
gresses Towards Conclusion: Responsibility to be Divided 50/50: Object is Long Term 
Agreements), Nikkei, Jan. 16, 1980, at 1; and interview with the Casualty Insurance 
Association, Tokyo, Japan, Jan. 22, 1980. 
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tional financial markets,95 and a joint venture for the leasing of 
heavy equipment rented in Japan to Chinese industrial concerns.96 
IV. COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 
A. Forms of Trade and Problem Areas 
"Diversified trade'' between Japan and the P.R.C. includes 
processing, assembly arrangements (including licensing 
agreements), compensation trade method, and joint ventures, in 
addition to plant export and purchase-sales agreements. These 
forms of trade are not unique to Japan-P.R.C. trade and are also 
employed regularly in Japan-Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) trade.97 
Processing (itaku kako [Japanese], lailiaojiagong [Chinese]) in-
volves the import of materials or samples from abroad to the 
P.R.C. The Chinese manufacture or produce finished goods and 
charge the Japanese supplier a processing fee for the manufac-
ture.98 Usually a portion of the raw materials is furnished from 
within the P.R.C.99 
Assembly arrangements (nockdown [Japanese], laijian-
zhuangbei [Chinese]) involve the supply by Japanese companies of 
samples and equipment to P.R.C. enterprises. At present, 
Japanese companies in the heavy machinery, electrical appliance, 
and electronics industries have been the primary suppliers. The 
P.R.C. company assembles the finished product using supplied 
items, and, to date, has sold finished products chiefly in the P.R.C. 
Where a Japanese company has not supplied equipment, the 
95. Chugoku: kokusai-shijo de shikin-chotatsu e: yen-date-sai o dashin: shoken ni-sha, 
sangatsu ho-chii-shi kyogi (China: To Seek Funds in the International Market: Inquiry as to 
Yen Denominated Securities: Two Securities Companies to Visit China in March for 
Discussions), Nikkei, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1. 
96. Pekin de lease jigyo: oriento lease goben kaisha setsuritsu e (Leasing Enterprise 
in Peking: Oriental Lease to Establish a Joint Venture Company), Nikkei, Jan. 31, 1980, at 
3. 
97. NICCHUBOEKISOKUSHINKAI (JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE), NI-CHU KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYOKA-BOEKI (DIVERSIFIED TRADE IN JAPAN-
CHINA ECONOMIC COOPERATION) 4, (Mar. 1980). 
98. Cohen and Nee point out that the Chinese differentiate between lailiaojiagong, 
the import of raw materials and packaging from abroad for processing and laiyangjiagong, 
the import of samples for processing based upon which the Chinese supply raw materials 
and manufactured goods. Cohen and Nee, China: All About Compensation Trade, Part/, 
The Asian Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1979, at 4. 
99. NI-CHlJ KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYOKA-BOEKI. supra note 97, at 5. 
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P.R.C. enterprise charges the company an assembly fee. Where 
equipment has been supplied, the P.R.C. discounts the assembly 
fee and credits to the Japanese side the portion of the full fee not 
charged against the installment payments due for the price of the 
equipment.100 
In compensation trade (hosh6-b6eki [Japanese], bushang 
maoyi [Chinese]) the Japanese side supplies equipment and essen-
tial materials to a Chinese enterprise for mining, agricultural, 
forestry, domestication, or light industry development. Chinese 
enterprises pay for supplied equipment and materials with the 
production from these enterprises or with products from different 
industries. There are two levels of production-sharing: (1) large-
scale national projects such as oil and coal development which are 
based on the Japan-China Long-Term Trade Agreement; 101 and (2) 
local level (usually provincial level) projects which are small to 
medium in scale and are not based on any trade agreement. 102 
Payments in production by the Chinese are at a set price for a 
fixed period. In contrast, payment provisions in each processing 
agreement have been negotiated on a case-by-case basis. If the 
Japanese side is displeased with the quality of goods produced by 
the P.R.C. enterprise, renegotiations will be held on the process-
ing fees stipulated within the agreement. As noted above, 
Japanese businessmen believe that a change in circumstances 
justifies a renegotiation of prices stipulated in a contract. Chinese 
enterprise management has also been willing to renegotiate prices 
for any processed articles which the Japanese side is reluctant to 
accept. 103 In light of this renegotiation practice, it would be pru-
dent to draft an automatic price readjustment clause in this type 
of agreement. This clause would provide for mutual discussions on 
the readjustment of price in the event processed goods fall below 
a certain level of quality. 
The Japanese government has published a set of guidelines 
100. Id. 
101. Shin-dankai no ni-chii kyoryoku; jo, supra note 52. 
102. Id. 
103. In one case, a Japanese purchaser ordered matching blue jeans and denim jackets 
from a P.R.C. seller, supplying manufacturing specifications. Upon inspection after arrival 
in Japan, the Japanese purchaser discovered that the blue jeans and denim jackets were dif-
ferent shades of blue. The P.R.C. seller agreed after prolonged negotiations to lower the 
price of the items. Interview with H. Hirai, Director and Editor, Japan Association for the 
Promotion of International Trade, Tokyo, Japan, Feb. 23, 1980. 
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for the handling of these specific trade forms. 104 In the production-
sharing method, resource development in the form of large-scale 
national projects will be recognized. This recognition stems from 
the Japanese government's policy to secure a stable oil and coal 
import supply from the P.R.C. 
Other forms of trade will be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis. However, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
will not approve production-sharing agreements involving the sale 
of equipment to be paid for by the Chinese side in manufactured 
goods.105 
In processing trade, those goods which are not "notably com-
petitive" with domestic goods will be approved on the same basis 
as is used with goods originating from other countries. This 
qualification demonstrates the favorable treatment which the 
Japanese government accords Chinese products. Assembly ar-
rangements and joint ventures in Japan between a Japanese and a 
P.R.C. enterprise will be handled in the same manner as is 
presently in force. 106 
There are also numerous pricing and financing problems in 
diversified trade. In compensation trade, the Chinese enterprise is 
104. Tai-chu boeki suishin e seifu hoshin: shigen wa seisanbutsu bunyo: kyusho-hoshiki 
wa gensoku mitomezu (Government Policy is to Encourage Trade With China: Natural 
Resources to be Exchanged for Production: Production Sharing Method Will Not Be 
Recognized), Nikkei, Nov. 30, 1979, at 1. 
105. Id.; But see NI-CHU KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYO-KA-BOEKI, supra, note 97, at 23, 
which states that the Nikkei, Nov. 30, 1979 article is incorrect in reporting the non-
recognition of the production sharing method; rather, MIT! does not recognize a barter 
system of trade without exchange rate calculations. 
106. Any joint venture agreement between a Japanese corporation and foreign enter-
prise involving the establishment of a new company and new shares in a foreign country 
must be approved by the Ministry of Finance pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Law, 
Foreign Exchange Regulation, Article 14. If the joint venture is to be established in Japan, 
approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Finance and other concerned ministries pur-
suant to the Foreign Investment Law, Article 11. As of December 18, 1980, the Foreign In-
vestment Law will no longer be in effect. However, those intending to establish a joint ven-
ture in Japan will still be required to report the contents of the agreement for notification 
purposes to the Ministry of Finance. See Seki, Gaikoku-kawase oyobi gaikoku-boeki kanri-ho 
no kaisei ni tsuite: jo; ge (Regarding the Revision of the Foreign Exchange Law, I, II), Nos. 
860 and 861 Shoji-homu (March 1980). 
Those Japanese corporations intending to engage in processing trade must receive ap-
proval from MIT! pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Law, Export Trade Control Regula-
tion, article 2-1, or article 1-1-2 and Import Trade Control Regulations, article 8-1-2. 
Those Japanese corporations intending to dispatch technology to the P.R.C. under a 
license agreement (including compensation trade) must obtain approval from MIT! pursuant 
to the Foreign Exchange Law, Foreign Exchange Regulation, article 17-1-2. 
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contractually obliged to remit a fixed quantity of manufactured 
goods within a set time period to the Japanese party. In process-
ing, however, the possibility exists that a dispute may arise as to 
processing fees or the price at which manufactured goods are sold 
to the Japanese enterprise which supplied the materials or parts 
for processing. In addition, if the manufactured goods are to be 
sold in Japan, the currency in which payment is made may become 
problematic. 
From the Japanese side, itis essential that P.R.C. labor costs 
remain competitive and that prices change in accordance with 
market conditions in Japan. From the Chinese side it may be 
argued that the availability of higher retail market prices outside 
Japan should allow the P.R.C. enterprise to raise the processing 
fee charged to the Japanese party. To date, Japanese corporations 
have offered extensive technological training at low fees, in-
cluding quality control training, as a lever in pricing negotiations 
with P.R.C. enterprises. 
Letter-of-credit (L/C) financing of individual commercial tran-
sactions is subject to the requirement under Japanese law that 
separate L/C's be open for export and import. When exporting 
materials to be processed, for example, Japanese enterprises are 
required to have the Chinese side pay for raw materials with an 
L/C. When importing the processed goods from the P.R.C., the 
Japanese enterprise is required to establish an L/C in favor of the 
P.R.C. seller.107 These two requirements complicate the use of an 
L/C to finance trade. 
To overcome this problem, the following arrangement is 
employed. When exporting materials to the P.R.C., the Japanese 
side receives an L/C payable at sight on a certain date usually set 
after expected delivery of the processed goods from the P.R.C. 
Upon receiving the processed goods, the Japanese side pays with 
an L/C payable on demand. As the price of the processed goods ex-
ceeds the price of materials, the balance in favor of the P.R.C. 
enterprise is then remitted to the Bank of China.108 
In the case of compensation trade, the long term between in-
vestment of equipment and production from a Chinese factory 
necessitates the use of financing. Several methods are currently 
107. NI-CHU KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYOKA-BOEKI. supra note 97, at 18. 
108. Id. at 19. 
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used. In the most commonly used method, a Japanese supplier will 
obtain a supplier's credit from a Japanese bank. The Bank of 
China will then remit payment to the Japanese bank. This transfer 
of funds from China to Japan will then be offset by a loan from the 
Japanese bank to the Bank of China. 
B. Contractual Provisions in Japan-P.R. C. Private Commercial 
Agreements 
This section focuses on the differences among Japan-P.R.C., 
Japan-U.S., and Japan-third world private commercial agree-
ments. In particular, provisions from a form purchase contract 
drafted by the Chinese buyer109 and J apan-P .R.C. licensing 
agreements110 are compared with Japan-U.S. and Japan-third 
world sales and licensing agreements.111 
Arbitration provisions yield the most striking difference be-
tween Japan-P.R.C., Japan-U.S. and Japan-third world commercial 
agreements. In the Japan-P.R.C. sales and licensing agreements, 
the first sentence of the arbitration clause provides that, "all 
disputes which arise with relation to this contract or with the ex-
ecution hereof, shall be solved by the parties through consultation 
with each other ."112 This wording reflects Japanese and Chinese 
preferences for reaching a compromise solution that will avoid the 
loss of face and the expense involved in proceeding to open 
dispute in the form of arbitration. 
The place of arbitration is specified as the place of the party 
to whom the demand for arbitration has been addressed. If the ar-
bitration is to take place in the P.R.C., the procedure is governed 
by the arbitration rules and procedures of the Foreign Trade Ar-
bitration Commission of the China Counsel for the Promotion of 
International Trade. If the arbitration is to take place in Japan, 
the rules and procedures of the Japan Commercial Arbitration 
Association are applied. 
109. These contract provisions are from a form purchase contract used by China 
Metals & Mining Import-Export Company reprinted and discussed in Ni-chu boeki ni okeru 
'keiyakusho ': keiyakusho kisai-rei no ken to ('Contracts' in Japan-China Trade; Examination 
of Contract Provisions), NBL, No. 8 at 36-39 (Jan. 15, 1972). 
110. NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 29, and interviews with C. Kaneda, Japan-
China Friendship Association, and H. Hirai, supra note 103. 
111. Examples of U.S.-Japan sales and licensing agreements and Japan-third world 
licensing agreements are drawn from the authors' work product. 
112. NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note l, at 49. 
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An interesting problem arises, however, in the case of cross-
claims. In one case, a Chinese enterprise served a demand for ar-
bitration on a Japanese corporation. Under the above clause, ar-
bitration was to be held in Japan. The Japanese party cross-
claimed, and the Chinese party asserted that the cross-claims 
must be heard in the P.R.C. The parties finally agreed, after pro-
longed negotiations, on hearing the whole case in Japan. 113 
Arbitrators are not limited to the names in the register of the 
Japanese or Chinese association. A third-country national may be 
chosen as an arbitrator with the agreement of both parties. 
The arbitration decision is final and binding upon both par-
ties. However, each association is obliged to obtain the approval of 
its respective national government to give full force and effect to 
the decision. Thus, in theory, if one government did not approve of 
the arbitration decision, the other party to the agreement would 
be unable to enforce the arbitration award. This possibility serves 
to pressure the parties into reaching agreement through friendly 
discussions. 
In contrast, a Japan-U.S. agreement rarely places an obliga-
tion on the parties to engage in friendly discussions to reach a 
compromise solution before proceeding to arbitration. Japan-U.S. 
sales and licensing agreements usually provide for the settlement 
of disputes in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Trade Arbitration 
Agreement of September 16, 1952,114 or with the rules of the Japan 
Commercial Arbitration Association. Under the U.S.-Japan Ar-
bitration Agreement, the site of arbitration is the place of the party 
to whom the notice for arbitration has been addressed. Arbitration 
decisions are also binding subject to enforcement in the courts of 
either country. 
Japan-third world licensing agreements usually provide for 
arbitration in Tokyo under the rules of the Japan Commercial Ar-
bitration Association. In those agreements where the licensee's 
government requires application of its own laws, the Japanese 
licensor usually inserts a provision providing for arbitration in ac-
cordance with the rules of the International Chamber of Com-
merce. 
Force majeure clauses in Japan-P.R.C. sales and licensing 
113. Interview with M. F. Higgins, attorney at law, Graham & James, Tokyo, Japan, 
Apr. 19, 1980. 
114. Arbitration Agreement, supra note 5. 
115. Ni-chu boeki ni okeru 'keiyakusho:' keiyakusho kisai-re~ supra note 109, at 37. 
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agreements are also different from their counterparts in 
Japan-U.S. agreements. Prior to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Japan and China in 1972, only war and natural 
phenomena were included in force majeure clauses. 115 In post-1972 
provisions, strikes, lockouts, government orders, and other force 
majeure conditions have been added. 116 In the case of Japanese ex-
ports to the P.R.C., delay in arrival at the Chinese port of destina-
tion due to port congestion is not included within the scope of the 
force majeure provision. 117 
The sales agreement provides that if the force majeure condi-
tion continues for four weeks or more, the P .R.C. buyer may 
unilaterally cancel the contract. This right is not specifically ac-
corded to the Japanese seller in the wording of the provision. The 
Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements provide that if the force ma-
jeure condition continues for more than ninety days, the parties 
will engage in friendly discussions in order to promptly settle the 
question of the continued effectiveness of the agreement. A 
typical Japan-U.S. sales agreement, in contrast, lists a number of 
force majeure conditions such as blockade, embargo, mobilization, 
fire, flood, hurricane, typhoon, and landslide. 
Other provisions of interest in the Japan-P.R.C. sales agree-
ment include method of payment, shipment terms, inspection of 
quality and quantity, warranty, and penalty for delayed perfor-
mance. 
L/C is the sole method of payment, and an L/C is to be in-
itiated subsequent to the receipt, within twenty to thirty days 
before shipment, of a cable from the Japanese seller which states 
the prospective date of shipping. L/C's prior to 1972 were 
established by the P.R.C. purchaser with the Bank of China and 
were payable only at a friendly Japanese bank. Payment was ef-
fected in pounds sterling or French francs (usually the former) via 
a bank with which both the Bank of China and the friendly 
Japanese bank had a correspondent agreement. 
At present, L/C settlement may be between the Bank of 
China and any one of thirty-one Japanese banks with whom cor-
respondent agreements have been concluded. 118 More than fifty 
116. NI·CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note l, at 39-40. 
117. Interview with H. Hirai, supra note 103. 
118. NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 77, lists the thirty-one banks which have con-
cluded correspondent agreements with the Bank of China. 
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percent of the transactions are settled in U.S. dollars with the re-
mainder being settled primarily -in Japanese yen or Chinese ren-
minbi. Procedures for settlement are governed by the agreement 
between Japan's foreign exchange banks and the Bank of China. 119 
Prior to 1972, in cases where products to be sold were on the 
CO COM list, Japanese sellers were required to send, in a telegram 
to the Chinese buyer, the approval permit number issued by the 
Japanese government. While the Japanese seller is still required 
to telegraph a permit number issued by the Japanese Government 
for items on the COCOM list, relaxation of COCOM restrictions 
against the P.R.C. have rendered this requirement a formality in 
most cases.120 
Inspection of quality and quantity of each shipment must be 
performed at the port of origin by an inspector appointed by the 
P .R.C. or the manufacturer. Final acceptance, however, is subject 
to inspection at the port of destination by the P .R.C. Products In-
spection Bureau. If the inspector discovers a defect, the buyer is 
required to present a written claim to the Products Inspection 
119. The settlement agreement between Japan's foreign exchange banks and the Bank 
of China provides for: 
(1) currency to be used (presently at the buyer's option); 
(2) market price (based on the public announcements of the China Foreign Currency 
Administrative Bureau); 
(3) settlement of accounts (settlement in yen account or renminbi account); 
(4) procurement of yen/renminbi (purchases of renminbi or yen by each side); and 
(5) disposition of balance after settlement (at any time yen/renminbi may be ex-
changed by banks into U.S. dollars, and remitting of money overseas will be 
allowed). 
With regard to future settlements, the above banks have agreed that: 
(1) if future settlement is to be in yen, same will be transacted at a Japanese bank; if 
future settlement is to be in renminbi, same will be transacted at the Bank of 
China; 
(2) future settlement in yen/renminbi is for a concrete transaction; 
(3) future settlement will be limited to six months; 
(4) in principle, settlement should take place within one month after the execution of 
the contract; 
(5) it is possible to use future settlement for the export of the Japanese side, 
together with a note; and 
(6) when future settlement is employed, the contract number, product name, and 
amount will be reported. 
NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 74. 
120. c·ocOM approval is still required for a number of items including aircraft and 
computers. See Chugoku e YX yushutsu keikaku (Plan to Export the YX [Boeing 767] to 
China), Nikkei, Aug. 27, 1979, at 1; and Hozan-seitetsujo-yo no densanki: COCOM ga yushut-
su shonin: Hitachi nado yonsha de juroku-dai (Computer for Baoshan Ironworks: COCOM 
Approves Export: Hitachi and Four Other Companies, 16 Computers), Nikkei, Dec. 21, 
1978. 
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Bureau within ninety days for transmission to the Japanese seller. 
Thus, the significance of port-of-origin inspection is unclear in 
terms of interpretation of the purchase agreement. 
Warranty periods are from one to five years with the pur-
chaser having the options of repair at no cost or partial or com-
plete replacement by the seller at no charge. It is notable, 
however, that no provision reserves to the P.R.C. purchaser the 
right to terminate the agreement and demand damages if defec-
tive products frustrate the purpose of the contract. This long war-
ranty period contrasts with the period stipulated in a Japan-U.S. 
sales agreement. The latter usually specifies a one-year period. 
Force majeure is the only condition under which delayed 
arrival of products in the Chinese port of destination will avoid a 
penalty assessment. For every two weeks of delayed arrival up to 
a maximum of ten weeks, a penalty of 1 % (a maximum total 
amount of 5%) of the total contract price is assessed against the 
seller. After ten weeks, the P.R.C. purchaser acquires the right to 
terminate the contract. This penalty provision contrasts with 
drafting in the Japan-U.S. sales agreement where no penalty for 
late delivery is provided. The buyer only has the option to ter-
minate the whole agreement. 
There are a number of provisions in the Japan-P.R.C. licens-
ing agreements which are drafted differently from comparable 
provisions in the Japan-U.S. and Japan-third world licensing 
agreements. Those provisions include the preamble, technical 
assistance, price and payment method, and inventions and im-
provements. 
The preamble in Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements (P.R.C. 
agreement) states that parties A and B, upon the conclusion of 
friendly discussions, have concluded the following agreement. 
Preambles in Japan-U.S. licensing agreements (U.S. agreement) 
merely state that the agreement has been made on a certain date 
between parties A and B. In the P.R.C. agreement preamble, the 
parties are identified by name only, whereas in the U.S. agree-
ment, the state of incorporation and business address are specified. 
No "whereas" clauses are used in the P.R.C. agreement. This 
follows the Japanese belief that "whereas" clauses perform no use-
ful function. 121 In contrast, the U.S. agreement inevitably contains 
121. Woodward and Matsuo, Drafting License Agreements in Japan and in the United 
States, in PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 124, 125 (T. 
Doi, W. Shattuck ed. 1977). 
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"whereas" clauses. This reflects the belief in the United States 
that "whereas" clauses are useful in the interpretation of a con-
tract, especially where a merger clause is included in the instru-
ment.122 
Technical assistance clauses in the P.R.C. agreement are 
wider in scope than comparable clauses in the U.S. agreement and 
third world agreement. In the P .R.C. agreement technical 
assistance usually takes the form of the dispatch of Japanese 
technicians to the P .R.C. to engage in technical training for 
manufacture, management techniques, safety, and quality control. 
In addition, the Japanese side is obliged to guarantee that the sup-
plied technology is the most recent of its kind. This requirement is 
also reflected in Article 5 of the P.R.C. Law on Chinese and 
Foreign Enterprises.123 This article states that, "the technology or 
equipment contributed by any foreign participant as investment 
shall be truly advanced and appropriate to the P.R.C.'s needs." 124 
Fees and training periods for the licensee's personnel are not 
specified in the P.R.C. agreement. Rather, the parties agree to set-
tle these items by friendly and mutual discussions. 
The U.S. agreement limits technical assistance to the supply 
of printed technical information subject to prices charged by the 
licensor at the time of request. The Japan-third world agreement 
(third world agreement) limits technical assistance to the supply of 
printed technical information. 
Training is provided for in a limited manner, in contrast to 
the P.R.C. agreement. Trainees who are dispatched by the 
licensee are limited to a small number per year and, for a limited 
period only, receive training at the licensor's factory in Japan. The 
licensee is required to pay a training fee as charged by the licen-
sor. The licensor will dispatch technicians to licensee upon request 
for a limited period of time. 
122. A typical merger clause provides: 
There are no verbal agreements, warranties, representations or understandings 
affecting this Agreement, all previous agreements, or other negotiations, 
representations and understandings between A and B are merged herein, and this 
Agreement supersedes, cancels and annuls all contracts, undertakings or 
agreements of prior dates relating to the subject matter of this Agreement. 
123. Chu-gai-goshi-keiei-kigyo-ho (Law on Chinese and Foreign Enterprises), Article 5, 
states in pertinent part that, "[t]he technology or equipment contributed by any foreign par-
ticipant as investment shall be truly advanced and appropriate to China's need." 
NIHONKOKUSAIBOEKISOKUSHINKYOKAI (JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE), CHUGOKU KEIZAI-KANKEI HOREI-SHU (COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF 
CHINA CONCERNING ECONOMIC RELATIONS) 38-40 (1980). 
124. Id. 
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The payment method in the P.R.C. agreement is also dif-
ferent. Due to the difficulty of ascertaining the number of 
manufactured units to be sold by the licensee in the P .R.C., pay-
ment consists of a lump sum for the know-how which is supplied 
by the Japanese licensor. If the licensee exports manufactured 
units in the future, royalties on these units are to be settled 
through the friendly discussions and mutual agreement of the par-
ties. The payment currency is divided between U.S. dollars and 
Japanese yen. 
In contrast, the U.S. and third world agreements limit pay-
ment to an initial payment, with a minimum royalty to be paid 
semi-annually, and an additional set percentage royalty on 
licensee's sales of licensed products. In addition, separate charges 
are levied on the supply of technical information and training. The 
Japanese licensor obliges U.S. and third world licensees to supply 
records documenting sales for royalty purposes. The P .R.C. agree-
ment does not address this matter. 
In the P.R.C. agreement, clauses relating to inventions and 
improvements by the licensee are also different from provisions in 
the U.S. and third world agreements. The licensee is obliged to 
notify the licensor of any inventions and improvements covering 
the licensed products. However, the parties are to engage in 
friendly discussion to agree on the registration of any patents out-
side the P.R.C. In addition, the parties are usually obliged to hold 
conferences on a regular basis to exchange information concerning 
inventions and improvements. 
Finally, a number of provisions found in the U.S. and third 
world agreements are absent in the P .R.C. agreement. These in-
clude sub-licensing rights, warranties of non-infringement on third 
parties' patents, an assignment clause, and a governing law clause. 
Other Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements contain a governing law 
clause specifying the laws of both the P.R.C. and Japan. The 
absence of either a governing law clause or a governing law clause 
referring to two governing laws points to the emphasis which the 
Japanese and Chinese parties place on the arbitration clause and 
on the obligation to engage in friendly discussions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Emphasis on social harmony is a central theme in Chinese and 
Japanese society. In the legal systems of both countries emphasis 
is placed on the social obligations and the future relationship of 
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the parties over rights and obligations as expressed within the 
"four corners" of the written document. Thus, the Japanese and 
Chinese prefer drafting bilateral commercial agreements with am-
biguous wording, leaving a formulation of rights and obligations to 
the social compact of friendly discussion or mediation. 
Whether Japanese corporations will, in the long run, be 
benefited by this drafting approach depends upon the P .R.C.'s con-
tinued adherence to the policy of encouraging foreign investment. 
Yet, in the P.R.C. and Japan, where maintaining mutual trust 
outweighs rights and obligations, the Japan-P.R.C. model of com-
mercial agreements is instructive to U .$. attorneys in their draft-
ing approaches to U.S.-P.R.C. commercial agreements. If a U.S. 
corporation is to successfully develop business relations with the 
P.R.C., it is essential to emphasize mutual trust over rights and 
obligations. 
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VL APPENDIX 




A Company (hereinafter referred to as A) and B Company 
(hereinafter referred to as B) have hereby agreed with regard to 
the supply of A's manufacturing technology (hereinafter referred 
to as know-how) as follows: 
Article 1. Object 
A agrees to the manufacture and sale by B of X machine 
(hereinafter referred to as X) incorporating know-how. 
Article 2. Obligation of Notice 
2(1) B shall inform A of the quantity of X which B manufac-
tures on a case-by-case basis. 
2(2) B shall inform A in writing, in advance, of the identity 
of purchaser, quantity of X sold, price for each order, 
and delivery date for the sale of X, and shall follow A's 
instructions. 
Article 3. Royalty 
3(1) In consideration of the grant of know-how, B shall pay 
to A __ percent ( % ) of the total sales of X as royal-
ty. 
3(2) Royalty shall be calculated on the last day of each 
month based upon the amount of X sold per month by B. 
Royalty shall be paid in cash by the __ day of the 
following month. 
3(3) A shall not demand additional royalties from B, even if 
A registers any right regarding the know-how. 
Article 4. Treatment of Improvements 
4(1) In case the parties during the term of this Agreement 
develop improvements based upon which they obtain 
patent or other rights regarding X, A and B shall at no 
charge supply technical data and grant patents or other 
rights to each other. 
Article 5. Obligation to Protect Confidentiality 
5(1) B shall not reveal to others any secrets regarding know-
how. 
5(2) A may terminate this Agreement immediately and de-
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mand damages should B breach the preceding para-
graph of this Article. 
Article 6. Prohibition of Assignment 
B shall not transfer any rights or obligations granted 
hereunder to a third party. 
Article 7. Term of the Agreement 
The term of this Agreement shall be __ years from the date 
of the execution hereof. This term shall be automatically renewed 
for a period of __ years unless either party submits an objection 
to the other party __ months before the expiration of this 
Agreement. 
Article 8. Settlement of Matters not Provided for Hereunder 
Matters not provided for hereunder and questions regarding 
the interpretation of this Agreement shall be settled by mutual 
discussion between A and B. 
IN WITNESS HEREOF, two originals of this Agreement 
have been made, A and B setting their respective seals hereto and 
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